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TWO Sides
one issue two sides in the south china sea
The polemic of the South China Sea is far from reflective of either China’s relations with its Asian neighbours, or it’s relationship with the United States, and yet it is an issue that dominates popular understandings of China’s foreign policy internationally. This is due in part to mainstream media’s preoccupation with conflict and controversy, but also on account of deep-seated miscommunication of aims between international giants like the U.S. and China. Such miscommunication has created a sense of opposition between the two global powers, something akin to an immovable object and an unstoppable force — with the South China Sea stuck at the meeting point.
The Pros and Cons of U.S. Intervention
June 12, 2016
And it is not just the U.S. and China who have failed to adequately communicate their aims in the region, every interested party from San Francisco to Hanoi has proven vague and inconsistent in discussing the disputed islands. For example, recently-elected Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has said he is willing to talk with Beijing and is open to discussing joint exploration of resources in the South China Sea, while simultaneously pledging to ride a jet-ski and plant a Philippine flag on a disputed reef now controlled by Beijing. The series of disputes have emerged over the Xisha (Paracel) Islands, the Nanwei (Spratley) collection of islands and reefs, and the Minzhu Jiao (Scarborough Shoal).
According to the UNCLOS 200-mile nautical line, the Xisha Islands fall mostly within the territory of China, with some islands and reefs falling within Vietnam’s 200-mile line and some falling outside of any claim. The islands have been a cause for dispute between China and Vietnam since the 1970s, when the South Vietnamese government launched land and sea battles to prevent the Chinese from expanding and occupying the western Vietnamese side of the island chain. Without the support of the Americans, who were busy fighting the Viet Cong at the time, the Vietnamese soon dropped their attempt to militarily take back the islands.
China has assumed control ever since.
Equally unhelpful in this dialogue is the ideological history of either side. China initiated a policy of anti-American thought following the Korean War, which has pervaded much of its developmental rhetoric until today. Catching up with the U.S. and resisting the threat of a U.S. invasion are still used in both economic and military policies as recent as the current Five-Year Plan. A history of using anti-US rhetoric has also crippled Beijing's ability to concede to international opinion, if the arbitration results swing out of its favour. Many are linking the struggle for islands in the South China Sea with a similar debate arising out of Japan's claims to the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands in the East. Though anti-Japanese sentiment in China far outweighs any violent support for China's claims to the island chains in the South China Sea, Beijing's habit of stoking up national fury has proven to be a metaphorical shot to the foot, rather than useful in resolving the islands issue.
Similarly, the U.S. media have capitalised on anti-China rhetoric and irrational fears over the great China threat. A tough stance on China has featured prominently on the 2016 campaign trail, as it has in previous election cycles, and — although it is difficult to take Donald Trump seriously even with his mouth closed — the rhetoric has hit home with the electorate. Pew Research has found that Americans are almost 20% less likely to feel favourably towards China compared with the global average. Clinton, who has become decidedly more moderate in her stance on China recently, even employed the use of anti-China rhetoric in her campaign, condemning China for 'stealing' in its quest for an advantage over other nations.
In both nations, each tends to accuse the other of perpetuating a continual anti-campaign by playing on popular fears, and in both cases the tactic has proven dangerously counterproductive. Though they may have the public willing to support a small-scale regional war in order to satisfy egotistical grievances, neither side is close to genuinely launching a military campaign.
In 2012, Vietnam passed a law including the Xisha (Paracel) and Nanwei (Spratley) Islands within its sea borders. This prompted a similar response by Beijing, announcing that the two island groups fell under the governing authority of a newly established prefecture-level city, Sansha. The following year, both the Philippines and Vietnam lodged diplomatic protests against the establishment of Sansha and the inclusion of the islands under Chinese jurisdiction.
The Minzhu Jiao (Scarborough Shoal) conflict began in 2012, when the Philippine navy attempted to arrest Chinese fishermen who had been docked within the shoal’s waters. Their attempts to arrest the fisherman were blocked by two Chinese maritime surveillance ships. The tensions have apparently resulted in moves on both sides to boycott and restrict the products traded between the Philippines and China.
China's claim to the various islands and reefs under dispute is based on the "nine-dash line", which maps out the Chinese trade route into South East Asia. Many have argued that the islands China claims under the nine-dash line are closer to Vietnamese or Philippine territory, and should therefore be sectioned off in accordance with the UNCLOS 200-mile line, a ruling which Beijing itself helped to ratify. However, China would not be the first large nation to lay claim to islands far from its own shores, at the expense of weaker, less developed countries. British authority over the oil-rich waters of the Falkland Islands was reinforced by Washington's decision not to support the Argentine claim to the islands, which lie just off their eastern coast. Guam and Hawaii are hundreds of miles from America's coast, and yet still considered part of the United States without dispute. Australia's Christmas Island is closer to Indonesia than any part of the Australian landmass.
The legal validity of Beijing's nine-dash line is currently being discussed by an arbitration tribunal of five impartial experts on international maritime law. But Beijing has pledged to ignore any negative ruling that results from the tribunal, a move which has prompted U.S. involvement, in support of the nations lodging complaints against China.
The Pros and Cons of U.S. Involvement
Questions, and criticism, can be raised debating the necessity of involving the U.S. in what would otherwise be a series of bilateral agreements between China and neighbouring South East Asian countries. Resolutions, such as those between China and Vietnam in 2000, have been reached in the past, with the Chinese conceding both islands and territorial waters despite claims to oil and other resources, in order to reach a mutually acceptable agreement. China may yet prove willing to negotiate fairly on a bilateral basis, an approach which Beijing prefers to international intervention.
The involvement of the United States in the South China Sea conflict has served to antagonise and magnify what were otherwise regional issues. In many respects, the involvement of the U.S. has also triggered the media frenzy characterising the islands crisis as the spark that will ignite a third great war between global superpowers. But this is not necessarily a point of criticism against Washington’s moves to protect smaller South East Asian countries from the military and economic might of China.
However, the involvement of the U.S. may be of benefit to both sides of the “two orders” dialogue. Particularly in regards to outside perceptions of the issue. It is generally believed that smaller nations such as Vietnam and the Philippines are vulnerable to economic and military “bullying” by their significantly larger partner. In order to quell such arguments, China needs to either allow smaller South East Asian nations to unite as a regional political grouping, much like they are as part of ASEAN; or, China needs to allow smaller nations to be backed by a strong, preferably impartial and objective, global power. In supporting an equally balanced negotiation table, China would not only demonstrate its endorsement of fair play in international relations, but any decision reached diplomatically would be indisputable, preventing further conflict in the future.
Furthermore, the United States is in a position to encourage its allies in South East Asia to conform to the same rules it plans to impose on China. While the western media has condemned China's land reclamation in the region, with reference to Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross Island, little headline space is given to similar reclamation by Vietnam, or drilling operations by the Philippines. Though the physical number of acres reclaimed by the Chinese far outstrips that of the Vietnamese, the number of bases set up by Vietnam in areas claimed by both Malaysia and the Philippines far outnumbers those built by China. According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, China has built seven bases in the disputed Nanwei (Spratley) Islands. The Philippines have built eight, with only one base falling outside their claim-line. In contrast, Vietnam has built 29 both within their own claim-line and within those of the Philippines, Malaysia and China.
It is the responsibility of international arbitrator to act impartially when settling such disputes. If the United States aims to encourage China to conform to the judgement of international law, it must also demand the same of other, smaller parties within the dispute.
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It should be crystal clear to top leaders that China has no intention or capability to push the United States out of Asia and the U.S. has no intention or capability to block China’s rise in Asia and beyond. Unfortunately, so far, we have not seen adequate efforts to this end.
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The difficulty in allowing the U.S. to act as international intermediary in this issue is their longstanding vested interest in containing Chinese expansion, both regionally and globally. This containment approach to the Asia-Pacific Pivot was first put forward in 2011 by then-Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, who aimed to “strengthen bilateral security alliances; forge a broad-based military presence; and advance democracy and human rights”. Clinton's policy also advocated developing ties with China, but has thus far failed to properly integrate China into the American conception of Asia-Pacific regional unity. Chinese Ambassador to the US, Cui Tiankai, argued that the policy meant that:
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There has been too much stress on the military and security aspect, stressing traditional alliances without addressing adequately the real needs and concerns of the regional countries for economic prosperity and sustainable development.
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In 2014, however, the U.S. demonstrated a new approach to the Pivot to Asia policy that aimed to be more inclusive and tolerant towards the Asian giant; U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry almost replied directly to Cui’s criticism of Clinton’s six key lines of action, forcibly removing the militancy of the previous pivot and “rebalancing” the strategy to focus on economic growth and sustainable development. In a speech at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, Kerry also highlighted key points of cooperation that still continue despite “escalating tensions” in the South China Sea, he also argued that the U.S.-China relationship is the most consequential in the world today and will do much to determine the shape of the 21st century. According to Kerry, U.S. China policy should be built on the twin pillars of “constructively managing our differences” and “just as constructively” cooperating on issues of mutual interest. As Wang Jisi argues, the need for mutual displays of understanding is key, as is a clear understanding of either side's key interests:
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What the United States fears most is an ascendant China casting off the present international order and charting its own course, and in the process elbowing the U.S. out of Asia. In other words, as long as the U.S. believes that China has no long-term plans to overturn American hegemony, it is willing to tolerate China’s growing strength and its “restrictive” internal policies.
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On the Chinese side of the “two orders” dilemma, however, tensions are rising over the United States’ inability to accept and move forward with China's current political, economic and industrial trajectory. Political slights against China's human rights record, it's trade practices and it's status as a market economy, no matter how trivial, are enough to convince Beijing and the Chinese public of U.S. plans to initiate a “colour revolution” in China. This attitude emerges in the face of any dispute involving the two states. Faced with U.S. and UN support for the “Umbrella Revolution” in Hong Kong, the strengthening of U.S.-Taiwan (carefully, without completely committing to supporting independence), and continued media campaigns against China's abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet, Beijing is in the habit of blocking — if not completely ignoring — American resolutions on international issues, as anti-China rhetoric.
In order to allow issues of genuine importance to be heard over the noise, Washington needs to consider picking its ideological battles more carefully, rather than allowing for the continuation of a mass anti-China campaign that only serves to damage positive relations. For example, a genuine China-threat for both Washington and the American public as a whole, is Beijing’s inability to accept and move forward with a world policed under a system of U.S. liberal management. If Washington genuinely wants Beijing to accept that the current system of international relations functions because of America's role as an international mediator, it needs to put real political effort into convincing Beijing that it is comfortable with, and no threat to, China's current mode of government nor its position in Asia.
Note: The content of this article does not reflect the official opinion of any unit of the Chinese government. Responsibility for the views expressed in the article lies entirely with the author.
Image credit: japantimes
Written by Abbey Heffer
Despite diplomatic tensions in the South China Sea, overall Sino-American relations have not been severely hindered by the conflict. At this week’s high-level Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Beijing, both Chinese and U.S. policy experts have said that incremental progress has been made for accelerating bilateral investment treaty talks — a potential alternative to the Trans-Atlantic Trade Partnership that China has thus far been excluded from — and for encouraging RMB trading in the United States. When interests align, the two orders prove perfectly capable of cooperation. However, both sides will need to acknowledge the need for concessions when solving the diplomatic crisis in the South China Sea. On either side military means have been used counterproductively to antagonise and provoke a response from the other. Such measures are not only childish but dangerous, considering the many smaller nations lining the playing field.
As Wang Jisi, President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University, argued in 2015, the “contradiction” between “two orders” or “two supremacies” serves to irritate any issue — diplomatic or otherwise — that China and the U.S. jointly engage in. Here, Bey Critical interrogates the pros and cons of U.S. involvement in the South China Sea Islands struggle. The arguments below refer only to the islands in conflict between China and South East Asian nations, and not to the Diaoyu Islands in dispute with Japan. The Sino-Japanese conflict is of an entirely different nature, despite also concerning small island chains of disputed ownership.
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